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a grantor or devisor is the subject to which reference is now made
The general principles of alienation apply here as in other cases,
I
subject to restraints, if any imposed by law.
made
to particular
chapters,
been
Reference has, inpreceding
forms by which the design of a donor or specified purposes may
be carried into effect by means of trust provisions. And attention
has been called to some distinctions between the effect of conveyances made upon a pecuniary consideration and those where the
use or object of the grant is the consideration.
There is nothing peculiar in the acquisition of personal property
for church purposes requiring notice here. So far, attention has
been called to the acquisition of real property by church organizations.
The inquiry " How may church property be acquired," would
perhaps include the acquisition of yews by members of a church
or others; but this subject, the law relating to pews generally, and
cemeteries as connected with churches, will be reserved for subsequent chapters.
WM. LAWRENCE.
BELLEFO.TAINE,

0., February, 1874.

RECENT AMERICAN

DECISIONS.

S'upreme Court of Errorsof Connecticut.
KEENEY AND WOOD MANUFACTURING COMPANY AND ANOTHER V.
TIlE UNION MANUFACTURING COMPANY.
The owners of an upper mill, whose business required tle running of their mill
only hy day, detained the water of the stream during the night, such detention
and the larger discharge during the day causing serious damage to the owners of
a lower mill, whose business required the running of their mill both night and
,lay. The lower privilege was occupied several years before the upper, and after
tie upper mill was built the water was for several years allowed to flow during
the night, and the lower mill had used it by night and by day. Upon a petition
444 ; Pella v. Scholte, 24 Iowa 293; Trustees v. Havens, 11 Ill. 554 ; Wauyh v.
Leech. 28 Id. 488.

A dangerous doctrine is growing up that the legislature may appoint trustees
execute a trust : -Bryant v. lfcCandless, 7 Ohio, part 2, p. 135. See cases as
power of legislature to control private trusts, chap. 4, Dillon Munic. Corp.,
note, and cases cited.
The subject of the alienation of dedicated property is discussed in Dillon
Mlunic. Corp., 512.
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by tile lower mill-owners against the upper, for an injunction. against the detention of tile water IW night, it was held,

1. That the petitioners had acquired no superior rights by their earlier occupaition, or by thbir use of the water by night, so long as they had exercised no
rights greater than such as belong to them as riparian proprietors ; tile full flow
of tile stream being nothing beyond snch right.
2. That all that the petitioners were entitled to was a reasonable use of the
stream against an unreasonable use or detention by tile respondents ; that the question was whether the respondents had acted unreasonably in detaining the water
and that the burden of proof on this subject was on the petitioners.
The right in such a case of the upper mill-owner to make the stream useful to
him by detaining the water during the night, is of the same quality as the right of
the lower mill-owner to take the benefit of the constant flow. In deciding between these conflicting rights, there are to be considered : 1. Tie custom of the
country as to the running of mills. 2. The local custom, if there be one. 3. What
general rule will best secure the entire stream to useful purposes. 4. Whether the
detention of the water is necessarily an injury to the lower mill, and whether the
upparqnt injury is not caused by the insufficiency of its own privilege.
The maxim " aqua currit et currere debe " is applicable rather to the matter of
the diversion of a stream and to the ordinary rights of riparian proprietors as such,
than to the case of mill-owners, who have a right to make a reasonable detention
of the water by-dams for the purposes of their mills.

PrTITIoN for'an injunction, brought to the Superior Court in
tart.ford county, and reserved, upon facts found by a committee,
for the advice of this court. The case is sufficiently stated in the
opinion.
.Iyde and Buck, for the petitioners, cited 2 Kent Com. 439;
Tucker v. Jewett, 11 Conn. 311, 317, 324; IFngraham v. Hfutchhnson, 2 Id. 584; Mllason v. Hill, 5 B. & Adol. 1 ; Bealey v.
,Sfaw, 6 East 208; Brown v. Best, 1 Wils. 174; Sazunders v.
Xewuman, 1 B. & Adol. 258, 262; Tyler v. Wilkinson, 4 Mason
;1l6, 400 ; ary v. Daniels, 8 Met. 466, 478 ; Ortman v. Dixon,
13 Cal. 38; Wleatley v. Crisman, 24 Penn. St. 298, 302; Gillrt v. Johnson, 30 Conn. 183; Pollitt v. -Long, 58 Barb. 20, 34;
Saekrlder v. Beers, 10 Johns. 241 ; _iMerritt v. Brinkerhoff, 17
Id. 306; 7eontworth v. Poor, 38 Maine 243; Davis v. Getchell,
50 Id. 604; CJlark v. Rlockland Water Power Co.. 52 Id. 78;
Dilling v. il1furray, 6 Ind. 324; S'hears v. W~ood, 7 J. B. Moore
345; Chandler v. lowland, 7 Gray 348; Angell on Watercourses, 3d ed., § 115.
I. Shipnan and Robinson, for the respondents, cited Belknap
v. Trbble, 3 Paige 577; Tyler v. .ilkinson,

4 Mason 896;

Tacker v. Jewett, 11 Conn. 311; Parker v. Hotchtkiss, 25 Id.
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321; Gould v. Boston Dock Co., 13 Gray 442; Brace v. Yale,
10 Allen 441; Palmer v. Mulligan, 3 Gaines 307; Thu, ber v.
iartin,2 Gray 394; Hartzall v. Sill, 12 Penn. St. 248; Sampson v. Hoddinott, 1 C. B. N. S. 590; M-asoiz v. Kill, 5 D. &
Adol. 1; Arkwright v. Gell, 5 M. & W. 202 ; Cary v. Daniels,8
Met. 466; Kinq v. Tiffany, 9 Conn. 166 ; Tiwiss v. Baldwin, Id.
306; TJFadsworth v. Tillotson, 15 Id. 366; Barrett v. Parsons,
10 Gush. 367; Springfield v. Rarris, 4 Allen 494; Ufaskins v.
Haskins, 9 Gray 390; Pitts v. Lancaster Mills, 13 Met. 156;
Hetrich v. Deachler, 6 Barr 32; Hoy v. Sterret, 2 Watts 327;
Clinton v. Meyers, 46 New York 511; Davis v. Getchlull, 50
Maine 602; Jacobs v. Allard, 42 Vt. 303; Angell on Watercourses, § 119.
SEYMOUR, J.-The plaintiffs own paper-mills on the tIockanum
river, and find it necessary for the successful prosecution of their
business to run their mills during the entire twenty-four hours of
the day. The defendant company owns a cotton factory situate
on the same river, about a fourth. of a mile above the plaintiffs'
mills, and the defendants run their factory during the day only,
from six o'clock in the morning until six at night, and find it necessary for the successful prosecution of their business to detain
the water of the river during the night, and they do thus detain it
by means of a dam of such height that at night in times of drought
very little water escapes from it.
All the parties depend mainly upon the power of the stream to
drive their machinery. Steam-power is, however, used as auxiliary to the water-power by the defendants and also by the mill of
the plaintiff Adams.
The plaintiffs preferred their bill in equity to the Superior Court,
complaining that the defendants by means of their dam have
wrongfully detained the water so as to prevent the plaintiffs from
having it as it was accustomed to flow and ought to flow during
the night season, and so as in the daytime to be let down in greater
quantities than they can advantageously use it in their mills; and
praying for an injunction.
The Superior Court referred the case to a committee, who has
made an elaborate report, which is accepted ; and the question is
reserved for our advice what decree shall be passed.
For the full understanding of all parts of the case reference
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must be had to the report itself; but it will be easy as we pass
along to state enojugh of it to show on what grounds we proceed
in coming to the result we have reached.
The committee concludes its report thus: "The respondents
have never by their use and detention of the water since the
drought had a purpose of injuring the petitioners. They have not
acted maliciously or wantonly, but have acted with sole regard to
the most efficient service of their own mills. Their action has
been prudent and reasonable, provided, as they claim, they are
under no obligation to regard the necessities of the petitioners to
run their mills at night, if by so doing they will deprive themselves
of what is needful for the efficient running of their own mills by
day without resort to steam. If, on the contrary, as the petitioners claim, the latter are entitled to have the water flow at night as
it customarily did before the stone dam was built, in order to enable the petitioners to run their mills at night, as before, then the
increased detention by the respondents is unreasonable. It occasions, and is likely to occasion, a continuous substantial damage to
the petitioners, as compared with the former practice. -The respondents have more important business and investments in their
concern than either, perhaps both, the petitioners; very much
more than have the Keeney & Wood Company. If the respondents are entitled to hold the water at night to use in the day time,
a- against night work of the petitioners, their mills are adapted to
the size and capacity of the stream to run them, and their detention of the water reasonable, for otherwise they must resort to
steam as an auxiliary power at an increased expense. The petitioner Adams now has a steam-engine of one hundred and fifty
horse power, and both lie and the respondents have steam-power
adequate to their necessities, whatever be the right as to the detention of the water. It is, as between them, a question as to which
shall be at an increase of expense in using steam. The Keeney
& Wood mill has no steam-power, nor any need of it with the
power allowed to run as before the respondents built their stone
dam."
The principal question in the ease then is, whether the petitioners are entitled to have the water flow at night as it customarily
did before the stone dam was built, in order to enable the plaintiffs to run their mills at night as before.
Paper-mills have been in existence on the plaintiffs' privileges
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from about 1816, and running night and day since about 1823.
A cotton-mill running only in the day time has been in existence
on the defendants' privilege since about 1826. The defendants
have frequently rebuilt their dam, and from time to time added to
its height, and by shutting their gates at night the flow of the
-stream was frequently interrupted so as to cause more or less interferencewith the running of the petitioners at night. In 1867 the
defendants built the stone dam complained of, by which the water
is detained at night considerably more than it ever before had been.
The plaintiffs, in their brief, claim that they are entitled by such
user as is evidence of a grant, to have the water flow at night as
it did before the stone dam was built. But it is not claimed that
they have ever exercised any rights other or greater than such as
belonged to them as riparian proprietors. So long as the defendants had no occasion to detain the water at night, the plaintiffs as
riparian owners below were entitled to the uninterrupted flow of the
stream by night and by day, and under those circumstances, that
being their right, by the exercise of it they could acquire no right
to such uninterrupted flow, if afterwards the defendants had occasion to detain more of the water of the stream than they before
had done. Nor on the other hand do the defendants lose any of
their natural proprietary rights by allowing the water to flow past
their mill without interruption, or with only a partial interruption.
In order to maintain their proprietary rights they are not obliged
to detain more water than they have immediate use for. When
the defendants have occasion to detain more water they may do so,
keeping within the bounds of reasonable use; and the fact that
they have heretofore allowed the water to pass by them without
iletaining or using it to the full extent of their right, in no manner
impairs their present right to its full enjoyment.
These points were so fully considered and firmly settled in the
case of .Parker v. Hotehkiss, 25 Conn. 321, that this claim of
the plaintiffs, though it appears on their brief, was not insisted on
in the argument.
The plaintiffs also founded a claim in favor of the rights they
assert, on certain conversations which took place between the parties during the building of the respondents' dam. We think these
conversations create no estoppel, and certainly confer no rights.
The rights of the parties seem therefore to resolve themselves into
their natural rights as riparian proprietors, and all that the plain-
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tiffs are entitled to is a reasonable use of the stream, against an
unreasounablc use or detention of it by the defendants.
It is settled law that a.question o! this kind is one of fact, to be
decided upon all the circumstances of each particular ease, and in
order t.) authorize us to grant the plaintiffs' bill it must appear by
the direct finding of the committee, or as matter of legal inference
from the facts found, that the detention by the defendants was and
is unreasonable. Upon this vital point of the case the committee
makes merely a hypothetical finding, which has been already give)
at length, and which on examination certainly does not expressly
find the fact in favor of the plaintiffs. The increased detention of
the water by the defendants' stone dam is found to be unreasonable "if the petitioners are entitled to have the water flow at night
as it customarily did before that dam was built, in order to enable
the petitioners to run their mill at night as before." We have
already seen that the plaintiffs are not so entitled by grant, 'r by
I
such user as furnishes evidence of a grant.
The question then arises, are the plaintiffs so entitled upon any
other facts found by the committee. They insist that they are.
They say that the committee finds that their mills are adapted to
the size and capacity of the stream, and that they have heretofore
enjoyed the flow of the stream night and day without any material
interruption from the defendants above, and that the defendants
do now, more than they have formerly done, detain and interrupt
the current. The plaintiffs therefore claim that they have rights
by virtue of prior appropriationof the surplus water of the stream
to a useful purpbse. This claim has countenance in the early
cases, and so late as 8 Metcalf's Reports 478, Judge SIrAW says:
"Although the proprietor above might in the first instance have
raised his dam higher, keepifig within the limits of a reasonable
use, yet after such appropriation by the proprietor below he cannot
raise his dam and take such surplus, because as to that the lower
proprietor has acquired a prior right." A case in 13 California
Reports 38, is also cited by the plaintiffs in support of this claim,
but on examination of that case it appears to be the law of California that if one first diverts the water of a stream from its natural
channel and appropriates it to a useful purpose, h&acquires a right
to continue the diversion to the prejudice of riparian proprietois
below who may afterwards desire to use the stream. That case
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rests upon the peculiar law of that state, which in this respect differs
wholly from our law.
The doctrine announced by Judge SHAW in 8th Metcalf
appears not now to be the law of Massachusetts : Gould v. Boston
Duck Company, 13 Gray 442. The case of Parker v. lotckiss,
25 Conn. R. 321, shows that it is not the law of Connecticut. ' In
Parker v. Hotchkiss the plaintiff had made precisely the prior
appropriation which the plaintiffs have made in this case, and had
enjoyed it for more than fifteen years, and made the same claim
which is now under consideration. Judge WAITE, giving the opinion of the court, says : "It is difficult to see on what ground this
claim can be maintained so long as the plaintiffs in the use of their
mill and water privilege did not invade any rights of the
defendant."
We are not however prepared to say that such prior appropriation, especially if of long continuance, may not be taken into consideration at one of the many elements which enter into the question of fact, whether in a given case a detention of the water above
which interferes with an existing use and appropriation of it below,
be or be not reasonable. It is enough for the purpose of the present case to say that it is not a controlling circumstance, and certainly not in point of law decisive.
The plaintiffs claim, in the second place, that their rights as
mere riparian proprietors are violated by the acts of the defendants,
that it is a familiar maxim that "aqua eurrit et currere debet,"
and that under this maxim any detention of the water by the proprietor above is unreasonable which inflicts serious damage upon
the proprietor below; which the committee find is inflicted in this
case by the detention complained of.
Under the maxim referred to water cannot be detained for the
use of mills so as to deprive the proprietors below of what is needed
for domestic and agricultural purposes, and under that maxim water
cannot be diverted from its natural channel to the prejudice of the
lower proprietors upon the stream.
But water-power is made available mainly by means of dams,
by which it is temporarily detained, and its power tfiereby accumulated and stored up for use, and the maxim of debet currere is
not applicable to such detentions of the current as are convenient
and necessary, and usual for the purpose of making such accumulations.
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The right of the proprietor above to make the water useful to
him by detaining it long enough to render it useful, is of the same
qhality as the right of the proprietor below to take the constant
course of the current for his use, where both parties are applying
the water to the artificial use of propelling machinery. The two
rights being thus in apparent conflict, which must yield? In
deciding such a question many circumstances come naturally into
consideration.
1. In the present case, where the plaintiffs wish to run their
mills day and night, and the defendants wish to run theirs during
the usual working-hours only, the custom of the country may well
be referred to as an important consideration.
On this subject the committee finds that "for many years the
respondents have run their cotton-mill only in the daytime, from
( A. M. to 6 P. M., and this has been and is the general custom of
the country with cotton and woollen mills, and mills for the manufacture of most other goods; paper-mills being the leading exception."
Independently of this finding it is matter of notoriety that mills
usually lie still at night, and that dams are usually constructed of
such height and size as to detain the water during the night for
the more efficient working of 'the mill by day, and that where
individual dams are not adequate, large reservoirs are provided
like that mentioned in the committee's report at Rockville, the
gates of which are closed during the night in order, to store up the
power which during the day drives the machinery of a long chain
of mills which successively receive the supply.
The right of the up-stream proprietors thus to detain and use
the water is of the highest importance, and the case must be a
strong one in favor of the down-stream owner successfully to
resist it.
Tlc cases in Pennsylvania go much further than we are called
upon to go in this case in favor of the rights of the up-stream
owner. In that of Hfoy v. Sterret, 2 Watts 237, it was decided
that if the water was no longer detained than was necessary for
the proper enjoyment of it as it passed through the defendant's
land for the use of his mill, it was a damage to which the plaintiffs
(owning a mill below) must submit. In Whleelan v. AN, 29 Penna.
St. 98, the same decision was made, although by means of the
detention at night the water did not reach the lower mill till 8 or
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9 o'clock in the day, and during the remaif dcr of the day more
water was poured into the stream from the upper works than could
be used to advantage by the lower mill.
2. In deciding such a question it is important to consider
whether the damage of which the down-stream proprietor complains is the necessary consequence of the detention complained
of, and whether it may not be imputable to the insufficiency of his
own privilege. In this case it is found that "the Keeney & Wood
mill has a small and narrow pond only, running up to near the
respondents' lower wheels, and when the respondents run full they
must always have sent *morewater than the Keeney & Wood mill
used or could hold ; but this waste is a good deal increased by the
respondents' practice since the drought."
It appears from the committee's report that a paper-mill situate
on the Hockanum, above the defendants' cotton-factory, has a
reservoir of sufficient capacity to retaih the water sent down by
day from the Rockvill dam, and thus to run nights and days with
great uniformity, and thus that paper-mill does not suffer by the
nightly closing of the Rockville reservoir. It is obvious that if
the plaintiffs had such a reservoir they would have no grounds of
complaint against the defendants, and it would seem that a manufacturer proposing to prosecute a business which requires the use
of water night and day, a use admitted to be somewhat exceptional,
should secure a water privilege and a pondage adequate to his
wants.
3. In deciding such a question it is important to consider also
what general rule on the subject will best secure the entire water
of a stream to useful purposes. If the plaintiffs are right in their
claims, the defendants must either run their mill nights or suffer
the useless escape of half the water which flows past their mill.
But such water may be saved if the proprietor below is required
to see to it that if lie wants the water at night he must -secure a
privilege adequate to such a want. We think, if we should announce it to be the general rule that the water of streams may
not be detained and accumulated at night to be applied'to machinery during the day, we should render useless a large portion
of the water-power in the state.
4. In considering such a question, the local customs of a stream
are very proper subjects of inquiry, and it was strenuously urged
by the plaintiffs that the Ilockanum was mostly appropriated to
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paper-mills, and that these mills all run night and day. As already
stated, there is one paper-mill above the defendants' mill, but that
has a sufficient reservoir of its own for constant use. It appears
also that there are seeral paper-mills below those of the'plaintiffs,
but it does not appear that any of these mills are injuriously
affected by the detention of which the plaintiffs complain, and it
does not appear whether.they have or have not ample pondage of
their own.
There are other matters which we need not refer to, which may
properly bear on the question whether the acts of the defendants
of which the plaintiffs complain be or be not reasonable. As
already stated, the question is ultimately one of fact, and the
burden of proof is on the plaintiffs to show that the acts complained of are illegal or unreasonable.
We are satisfied that this is neither expressly found in favor of
the plaintiffs, nor is it found by necessary legal implication.
We therefore advise that the plaintiffs' bill be dismissed.
F OSTER, J.,

dissented.

The question involved in the foregoing
case is one of great interest, in most
parts of the country, and one not always
free from uncertainty and doubt. There
can be no question, practically, that
where, as in the present case, all the
parties to the action have only concurrent rights in the use of the water, in a
running stream, for tie purposes of propelling mills or machinery, it must be
allowed to those above to detain the
water a sufficient time to render it useful
to themselves. To what extent this detention may be carried, must depend
much upon the size of the stream, with
reference to the entire use demanded of
it by all the mills upon the stream. If
the quantity of water is sufficient for all,
it must be so used as to give all a constint supply.' In such cases it is most
unquestionable, that any needless detention of the water by the upper mills, to
the detriment of those below, whether
done purposely or negligently, constitutes
an actionable wrong.
All the cases
agree in th's.

But the perplexity begins only, when
the supply of water becomes insufficient
for all. In such cases the upper mills
cannot be denied the reasonable use of
the water, because it causes some detention and some inconvenience to those
below. That is indispensable to any
beneficial use of the water by the upper
mills, and to deny this, would be to gire
only the free and perfect use of the water
to the lower mills. The upper mills
are entitled to a reasonable use of the
water, in which all have a common interest, and this is to be measured by the
necessities of those below, and the extent of the deficiency in supplying all ;
so that each mill shall he saved its fair
proportion of the beneficial use.
Thus there have been cases where it
was" necessary to detain the water of a
small stream, in dry times, for many
days, five sometimes, in order that the
upper mill should have any reasonable
amount of beneficial use, and it has
therefore been held legal
Ietrich v.
Dcller, 6 'enna. St. 32. And there
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are many other cases involving the same common highway, and is continued no
principle: Hoy v. Sterrett, 2 Watts 327 ; longer than is necessary for that purpose,
l iller v. Miller, 9 Penna. St. 74; Davis the proprietor below is without remedy
v. Getciell, 50 Me. 602; lewhall v. for any injury he may have suffered
So in Pitts v. Lancaster
lre.son, 8 Cash. 595; Hayes v. I1aldron, thereby."
44 N. II. 580 ; Jlferritt v. Brickerhoff, 17 Mills, 13 Met. 156, it was held the proTie right of each mill- prietor of upper mills might detain the
Johns. 306.
owner is to a reasonable use of the water a sufficient time to fill his dam, so
water, and that must be measured, as that lie could operate his mills, and that
before said, by.the amount of the same "any loss which the plaintiffs temporarily
in proportion to the demands of all. sustained by it, was damnum absque inThe maxim Sic utere tuo at alienturn non juria." In Wood v. Edes, 2 Allen 578,
Wcdas, is not to receive a strict and literal it was held a riparian owner might deconstruction in all cases. If one were tain the water of a running stream by
bound absolutely to avoid all injury to means of a dam for the purpose of a
others, lie might, many times, be com- fish-pond, and that the mill-owners below
pelled to forego all beneficial use of his had no cause of complaint, if the water
own property. That will be specially were all returned to the stream before it
apparent in regard to the use of water, left his land, although the quantity of
by the upper mill-owners in a stream not water would thus be slightly lessened.
supplying water sufficient for all owners The principal case is probably corEaCh mill-owner must have rectly decided upon this point, alupon it.
his fair proportion of beneficial use, and though possibly admitting of some doubt,
must be allowed to detain the water a whether the water might not have been
sufficient time to secure this. No doubt allowed to pass the upper mill, to some
every mill-owner upon a stream, where extent, during the night, without unthere is reason to expect a deficiency of reasonably impairing the defendant's
water at times, is bound to construct use of it during the day. But we infer,
his machinery with reference to such oc- fromthe opinion, thatwbere mills demand
casional emergencies. But this rule will au. exceptional use of water, as papernot apply to extraordinary deficiencies, mills during the night, it is the duty
such as no one could reasonably haye of the owners to-so construct their reser.
anticipated. The role is thus defined in voirs, as to detain all that comes during
Tlurber v. Martin, 2 Gray 394, by the day, for that purpose, when that may
Chief Justice SnAw : "Every man has be done without unreasonably impairing
a right to the reasonable use and enjoy- the use of the water by proprietors
ment of a current of running water, as below.
In regard to the question how far suit flows through or along his own land,
for mill purposes, having a due regard perior rights may be acquired by prior
t, the like reasonable use of the stream occupancy and use of the water in a mill
hv all other proprietors above and be- stream, there can he no question, at
And in Davis v. Winslow, present, that no such rights can be thus
low him."
51 Me. 264, the court say: "If th8 de- acquired, unless by pre-emption, to which
tention is indispensable to the owner's wn adverse use of the water is required.
I. F. R.
reasonable enjoyment of his rights in the
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Supreme Court of Vermont.
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When anything remains to be done by either or both the parties to a contract
of sale, before delivery, the title does not pass.
So inflexible is this rule, that when the property has been delivered, if anything
remains to be done by the terms of the contract before the sale is complete, the
title of the property still remains in the vendor. The contract must be executed
-to effect a complete sale.
The mere delivery of goods to the vendee is not sufficient to take a case out of
the Statute of Frauds ; he must accept and receive them.

Tiis was an action of book account.
the opinion.

The facts appear in

R. C. Abell, for the plaintiff.
Joseph Potter and .Edgerton &- Nicholson, for the defendant.
The opinion of the court was delivered by
REDFIELD, J.-This action is book account to recover the price
of cord-wood, alleged by the plaintiff to have been sold the defendant in April 1869. Most of the wood was piled on the margin bf
Lake Champlain, on plaintiff's farm in Benson, in this state. Two
small parcels of tho wood were on the opposite shore of the lake.
About a week after the negotiation (which plaintiff claims was a
sale), the wood was carried away by the flood of the lake and lost.
The report of the auditor gives a minute detail of every incident
of the negotiation, and submits them to the court to interpret their
legal effect.
The parties met at the instance of the plaintiff, and inspected
the wood; after some discussion, it was agreed that defendant
should purchase the wood at $3.50 per cord, the defendant insisting that a portion of it was less than four feet in length, and
some abatement should be made for such deficiency, to which the
plaintiff did not assent.
It was a part of the agreement that the parties should meet and
measure the wood, and accordingly, on the same 19th day of April
1869, they proceeded to measure the several piles of wood, each
taking memoranda of the measurement as it proceeded. The defendant measured tie length and still claimed some abatement
I The Reporter, Mr. ROWELL, will accept our thanks for this valuable case.EDS. A. L. R.
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therefor. The plaintiff insisted that by the terms of the agree
ment the wood was to be assumed to be four feet in length. "As
it was getting dark when the measurement was completed, the
parties went home, each with the figures for having a computation
of the quantity of wood made therefrom ;" and both parties expressed their inability to make the computation at the time. On
the 21st of April, the defendant, with his son, went to the plaintiff's house, to see if they could agree about the quantity of wood
that had been measured, The plaintiff bad computed the quantity
of wood at 204 cords and some feet, "but, by mistake, had omitted
one pile containing some 60 cords." The defendant informed the
plaintiff that he made the quantity 246 cords, after abating five
inches for deficiency in the length of some portion of it; and proposed to the plaintiff that he would take the wood at 246 cords as
he made it, or at 204 cords as computed by the plaintiff. The
plaintiff replied that he might have it at 204 cords, and defendant
agreed to take it. After defendant left, the plaintiff discovered
the mistake, and immediately notified the defendant that he could
not have the wood at 204 cords. The defendant sent back word
that he would again meet the plaintiff, and did so, in the afternoon
of the same day. Plaintiff declined to let defendant have the
wood at 204 cords, but consented to throw off five inches in length
from two piles. Defendant refused to take the wood except .t
204 cords.
The auditor has stated many other incidents; but this is a substantial statement of the facts, as detailed by the auditor. It is
not claimed that the two piles of wood across the lake were deliv.
ered to the defendant either actually or constructively, so.the con.
troversy is confined to the wood situated on the plaintiff's farm in,
Benson.
I. The defendant agreed to purchase all the wood piled on tho
plaintiff's farm on the margin of the lake, at $3.50 per cord, and
if this comprised the whole case, it would be, in the language of
Lord BROUGHAM, in the case of Logan v. Lemesurier, 6 Mobre P
C., "Selling an ascertained chattel for an ascertainable sum ;'and by the rule of law applied to the sale of ponderous and bulky
articles, such as wood, logs, coal and the like, would effectually
pass the property to the vendee: Hutchins v. Gilchrist, 23 Vt.
88 ; Sanborn v. Kittridqe, 20 Id. 639 ; Birge et al. v. Edgerton,
28 Vt. 291. But this case has other elements which impress upon
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it quite a different character. It was part of the contract that the
parties should measure the wood and ascertain the quantity. They
met for that pur ose and disagreed ; and that disagreement was as
to the substance of the contract. The plaintiff insisted that it
was agreed, and part of the contract, that defendant should take
the wood at "1 running measure ;" the defendant claimed that lie
purchased solid cords; and that issue grew into controversy, but
was never settled. The report does not state when the price was
to he paid; but in the absence of any special agreement, it is to
be assumed that it was to be paid on delivery.
The principle is well settled, and uniform in all the cases, that
when anything remains to be done, by either or both parties precedent to the delivery, the title does not pass. And so inflexible
is the rule that, when the property has been delivered, if anything
remains to be done by the terms of tile contract, before the sale is
complete, the property still remains in the vendor: Parker v.
Mlitchell, 5 N. If. 165; Ward v. Shaw, 7 Wend. 404. The contract must be executed to effect a complete sale, "and nothing
further to be done to ascertain the quantity, quality or value of
BExNIETT, J., in Rutchins v. Gilchrist,supra,
the property."
" The general rule in relation to the sale of personal property, is
that if anything remains to be done by the seller before delivery,
no property passes to the vendee even as between the parties."
POLAND, J., in tale v. Huntly et al., 21 Vt. 147 ; Chit. Con. 396.
This rule of law applied to the facts, as reported in this case, retains the property in the wood in the plaintiff, and leaves the contract executory, and, as a sale, incomplete. The case of Simnons
v. Swift, 5 B. & C. 857, is much like this, but much stronger in
its facts. It was an action for the price of a stock of bark sold at
$92.55 per ton; after the sale it was agreed between the parties,
that the bark should be weighed by two persons, each party to
name one ; part of the bark was weighed and delivered ; the residue was much injured by a flood before it was delivered, and for
that reason the buyer refused-to take it. The court held that the
bark was to be weighed before delivery to ascertain the price, and
as that act had not been done, the property remained in the seller,
and that lie must bear the loss.
This was not a case where a portion was sold to be measured or
weighed from the bulk, which would have no identity until severed
and set apart, but the whole stock was sold and a portion weighed
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and delivered. The subject of the sale was " ascertained," and
the price "ascertainable," yet the weighing was a thing to be done
before the property passed to the purchaser.
In case of the insolvency of the defendant it could hardly be
claimed that the wood became part of his assets, or if attached by
his creditor, such creditor could hardly show a color of right as
against the plaintiff.
The plaintiff's counsel seem much to rely on the case of Crilmore
v. Supple, 11 Moore P. 0., -reported in 7 Am. Law Reg. (Old
Series) 246. In that case the plaintiff sold a raft of lumber for a
fixed price per foot, with-specification of the measurement of each
log, made by a public officer appointed for that purpose under the
law of Canada, amounting in the aggregate to 71,448 feet, "to be
delivered at Indian Cove booms." The seller conveyed the raft
to the place of delivery, made it fast to the booms, and notified the
servant of the purchaser of the delivery, who took possession of
the same. The judge charged the jury that "if there was an actual
delivery at the place, into the possession of defendant's servants
the plaintiff was entitled to recover." The jury found for the
plaintiff.
Mr. Justice CRESSWELL, in delivering the judgment, reviews,
approvingly, the English cases of Rtanson v. Meyer, 6 East 614;
Bugg v Minett, 11 Id. 210 ; and Wallace v. Breeds, 18 Id. 522 ;
and Simmons v. Swift, ut supra, and says: "1If it appears that the
seller is to do something to the goods sold on his own behalf, or if
an act remains to be done by, or on behalf of, both parties, before
the goods are delivered, the property is not changed." The learned
judge then proceeds to show that the rule1 of law, well established
by these cases, bad no application to that case, and in conclusion
says: "There was, therefore, nothing to be done by the seller on
his own behalf; he had ascertained the whole price of the raft by
measurement previously made; he had conveyed the raft to Indian Cove, and, according to the finding of the jury, had delivered
it there. Nor was there anything further to be done in which
both were to concur, as in Simmons v. wwift." The plaintiff recovered because the sale was completed by delivery; and nothing
further remained to be done.
II. We think this case.within the Statute of Frauds. Our
statute is a substantial re-enactment of the 29 Charles II., and
has received the same construction given to the English statute.
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Speneer v. Bale, 30 "Vt.314, was a book action for the price of
a quan ity of fence-posts, inspected and purchased by defendant,
to be delivered on ihe cars at Shaftsbury. The plaintiff delivercd
the posts oa tihe cars furnished by defendant, at Shaftsbury, and
they- were conveyed to defendant's residence in New York. The
defendant claimed that he never " accepted" them. The case
turned upon the effect of the Statute of Frauds.
Chief Justice RDFrIELD delivered the opinion of the court,
holding that the reception of the posts on board the cars, furnished
by the purchaser, and the forwarding of them by the station-man,
who, fbr the purpose was his agent, was an acceptance; and in
defining the rule for compliance with the Statute of Frauds, says,
"It is undoubtedly true that the defendant, at the time and place,
had a right to repudiate the posts after delivery. In other words,
in order to perfect the case, under the Statute of Frauds, something more is necessary than a mere delhery of the goods. In
the language of the statute, the purchaser must "accept and receive part of the goods." Authorities might readily be multiplied
affirming the rule in substantially the same language, but we recur
to it as of acknowledged authority in our own courts. If we could
hold, in this case, considering the nature of the property sold,
that there was no constructive deliery, yet, under the Statute of
Frauds, "the purchaser bad the right, at the time and place, to
repudiate the wood after deliz'erjy." And the auditor finds distinctly that-the defendant, while the measurement was being done
(one act provided for by the contract of sale), refused to take the
wood, upon the terms and conditiQns prescribed by the plaintiff;
and the plaintiff as distinctly refused to let him have the wood
upon the terms exacted by the defendant. It is not important
which party was in the wrong. It is enough that the purchaser
refused to " accept" the wood, to render the sale invalid under
the Statute of Frauds.
The judgment, therefore, of tile County Court is reversed, and judgment on the report for defendant to
recover his costs.
The foregoing decision seems to us
most unquestionable upon both points,
and the law is so fully discussed and so
clearly presented, that we can scarcely
hope to add much for its elucidation.
VOL. XXlI.-7

Upon the first point the court do not intend to imply thatadelivery,in all cases,
on the sale of goods is essential to pass
the title; hut only, that in general, and
where there is no contract to the con-
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trary, the delivery and the passing of the numerous in support of th's general
title are concurrent acts. A sale of proposition.
goods, as betwei the parties, may be
Thie other point in the case is one of
complete without delivery, so as to en- more nicety, and in regard to which the
able the veiidor to maintain an action language of different writers and judges
for goods bargained and sold. In such is less harmonious. The doubt seems
cases the vendor may have a lien upon to be whether the Statute of Frauds
the goods for the price, and at the same really requires anything more by "actime maintain an action for its recovery. cept and receive part of' the goods,"
And the vendee may also, upon tender than a formal delivery. Most of the
of the price and demand of the goods, cases seem to imply that something more
maintain an action for them: Bowdell v. is required. And still a delivery, withParsons, 10 East 359; or even without out remonstrance or protest, seems to
formal demand, where the vendor has imply all acceptance anl receipt on the
put it out of his power to make the de- part of the deliveree. Delivery is more
livery: Bach v. Owen, 5 Term R. 409. than a tender, which is an offer if the
But in all cases of sale the title will re- party will accept. The acceptance conmain in the vendor until the contract is verts the tender into a delivery or payfully executed on his part, and he con- nment. And still the acceptance in case
sent to have the title pass :
a'unsley v. of delivery may be merely passive, as
Turner, 2 Bing. N. C. 151. And it was where delivery of goods to a carrier is
here considered no objection against made at his station or warehouse. But
treating the sale as perfected, that the acceptance under this clause in the Statseller, having made his measurement ute of Frauds must be active and disof the separate portions of the goods, tinct ; such as will preclude the vendee
had not fully-computed the gross amount. from objecting to the goods thereafter,
And where the parties agree that the unless he accept under protest, which
title shall pass to the vendee and a he may, do. But at all events, his acformal' change of possession is ef- ceptance must be such as to preclude the
fected before the goods are measured or vendee from claiming that the sale has
weighed, the fact that this is agreed to not been fully executed hy the parties.
be done thereafter will not preclude the fence it has been held that shipping the
passing of the title: Oh.iphant v. Baker, goods on board a vessel selected by the
5 Denio 379. And in Riddle v. Trar- vendee I and signing a bill of lading by
num, 20 Pick. 280, the same rule is re- the master, will not satisfy the Statute
cognised. DiwRt, J., said: " Such a of Frauds: Meredith v. Meiqlh 2 Ell. &
case presents a question of the intention BI. 364; -orman v. Phillips, 4 M. &
of the parties to the contract."
But un- W. 277; Shepherd v. Preu.ey, 32 N. II.
less it distinctly appear that it was the 55. But the vendee, if the goods are
intention of the parties to treat the sale forwarded by common carrier, is not at
as complete before the ascertainment of liberty, to repudiate them at an indefinite
the quantity, this will be regarded as a time thereafter, but must do'it at once
condition precedent to the passing of the Bushel v. Wheeler, 15 Q. B. 442.
title : Sennios v. Swift, 5 B. & Cress.
I. F. R.
857. The cases are uniform and very
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In Kentucky, negotiable paper, unless discounted at a bank, passes subject to
all equities existing between the parties. Where it is given for the price of land,
the vendor executing a deed, with full covenants of warranty of title, the land
heing at the time encumbered by a mortgage or vendor's lien, the purchaser will
he entitled, in equity, to set off the amount of' the mortgage against his notes, if
hlefire the notes become due the vendor has become insolvent. And the vendee,
having said to one who had the notes for sale, that they"' were all right," will
not preclude him from making such defence.

The opinion of the court was delivered by
LINJDSA , J.-If the note sued on in this action still belonged
to Pearson, the payee, it is manifest that Thompson would have
the right to demand that the mortgage-lien owned by Mayo should
be extinguished before judgment should go against him for the
balance now in litigation, unless Pearson could show that it was
part of the contract between himself and Thompson, that the latter,
in addition to the two notes for $3000 each, was also to pay off and
satisfy the mortgage-debt.
The acceptance of a deed with general warranty woqld not preelude Thompson, in a contest with Pearson, the latter being insolvent, from demanding a clear and unencumbered title before paying the purchase-money, and the right to make this demand would
not depend upon Thompson's knowledge of the defect of title, nor
of Pearson's insolvency at the time of the acceptance of the deed,
but upon the existence of the defect and the insolvency at the
time Pearson should seek a specific execution of the contract of
purchase, i. c. the payment of the purchase-money.
The distinction between the case of a plaintiff seeking a specific
performance in equity and a defendant resisting such performance,
is well defined and universally recognised : Story's Eq. Jur., sect.
769 ; Hlateher and Tife v. Andrews, ,c., 5 Bush 561. There
is no proof conducing to show that Thompson agreed to pay off
the mortgage debt, the recital in the deed that $3000 were paid in
cash, when in point of fact no such payment was made, is a circumstance from which the inference might be drawn that something
more than $6000, the amount of the two notes, was to be paid for
the property, but in the absence of direct evidence that such was
the ease, and in view of the positive and uncontradicted statements
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of Thompson to the contrary, this inference cannot be allowed to
charge him with the payment of the mortgage debt.
The testimony of Mayo establishes only that Thompson told
him that his claim would be paid when the arrangement for the
purchase was consummated, or that Thompson had loaned or expected to advance some money to Pearson, to enable him to release
the mortgage lien. This evidence rather tends to rebut the prosumption that Thompson was himself to satisfy the mortgage,
and harmonizes with his statement that Pearson agreed to pay.
Mayo. out of the first moneys realized by a sale of the notes. The
evidence of Davis also conduces to show that Pearson had made
this agreement. le states that in the conversation he had with
Thompson when contracting for the property, the latter informed
him that Pearson had promised 'o pay off Mayo's mortgage, but
that he did not know whether he had done so or not. Thompson
did not state to Davis that he would lose money on the property
in selling it for $8500, but that if he had to pay off the mortgage,
the paving claims, and the full amount of the note sued on in this
action, that he would in that event lose money.
So far we have considered this case as though Pearson was the
plaintiff. As to the matters considered Mrs. Tenley occupies no
more favorable attitude than he would have occupied. The assignment to her did not impair Thompson's right to any defence, discount or offset he might have used against Pearson. It remains
now to be determined whether Thompson is estopped to make the
defence relied on, and whether he by promises to pay the note
prevented Mrs. Tenley from discounting it, and thereby placing it
upon the footing of a bill of exchange. The only statement
made by Thompson before the purchase of the note by appellee,
from which it could possibly be inferred that he had no defence,
set off or counter claim on which he could or would rely to defeat
its collection, was the conversation with Green, the clerk of Norton,
Gault & Co., with whom Pearson had left the note to be sold.
When asked by Green if the note was all right, Thompson replied, "Of course it is all right, if I had not thought it was all
right I would not have given my notes." Green did not tell
Thompson the name of any person who was negotiating for the
note, nor did Green ask for, or Thompson give him authrity to
repeat this conversation to persons to whom he might offri to sell
it. Green was the agent of Pearson and not of appell-c
The
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statements or assuranees made by Thompson to Green are no more
binding upon hini. tlian tl,(.y would have been if made to Pearson

limself. Besides tlis, there is no evidence that the note was purclascd iupon the faidth of those statements. Green states that
Tenley, the agent of appellee, said to him, that relying upon
Thompsonl'S representations lie would buy the notes, but Tenley's
deposition is not taken, and we have no means of knowing whether
lie relied on these representations or upon his own judgment. In
the case of Smith v. Stonce, 17 B. Mon. 168, the assignee purchased
the note in consequence of representations made to his agent. In
the case of 3Mc.Bryer v. Collins, 18 B. Mon. 833, the payer of the
note represented to the assignee himself that it was good. We have
found no case in which the payer has been estopped to make defence, because of statements made to tme payee or to the payee's
agent, and conceive that the doctrine will never be carried to that
extent, unless it can be shown that he constituted them his agents,
and expressly authorized them to repeat his statements to persons
to whom they might propose to sell the note. No such express
agency can be inferred from thetreet conversation between Thompson and Green. It is therefore immaterial so far as Thompson's
h.gal rights are concerned, whether Tenley did or not rely on the
statements made to Green.
There is absolutely no proof conducing to show that Thompson
promni.d to pay tile note after the assignment, except what he
hiim:lf says as to his conversation with the cashier of the Farimers and Drovers' Bank, where the note was left for collection.
A daiy or two before it became due, lie "asked if the bank had discounted it, and ifso, whether it could be renewed. The reply
was '"that the bank had not discounted it, but that Mr. Abbott
had left it there, and to see him." Ile went again on the
day the note was due, "and was told that Mr. Abbott had said
the note could not be renewed by my giving security." From
this it is clear that Thompson did not agree to pay the note, and
did nothing calculated to prevent appellees from discounting it.
Nor does it matter that Thompson did not see Abbott about the
renewal, as lie, Abbott, had left word at the bank that lie would
not be permitted to renew it. We are of opinion that Thompson
has made out a good defence to so much of the note as is now
being litigated, and that lie has been guilty of no act that estops
him from relying upon such defence; there are other matters can-
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vassed by counsel, but as they are not material to the issues involved, they will not be considered by the court.
Opinion by LINDSAY, J., on petition for rehearing.
In the cases of .Ridgway v. Collins, 3 A. K. Marshall, and
Bobbins v. Hally, 1 Monroe, there was no connection between the
"demands sought to be set off against each other. 'In each case the
court notices this -fact, and gives it as one of the reasons, why
relief will not be granted.
In the case of -Daviessv. Newton, 5 J. J. Marshall 90, the
court recognises the right, where the demands are connected, to
have them set off, even though the assignor of the note had removed from the state or became insolvent after notice of assignment.
In this case the demands are not only connected and growing
out of the same transaction, but Thompson defends upon a ground
always recognised in equity. He is resisting the specific execution of a contract for the sale of realty, because of defect of title
and the insolvency of his vendor.
When Thompson accepted Pearson's deed, he did not waive his
right to insist that encumbrances on the title Ehould be removed
before paying the purchase-money, in case his warrantor became
insolvent before the same became due and payable. Pearson
could not. deprive him of this right by assigning the note.
Appellant sued on the note three days after it was due. Thompson answered a month afterwards, setting up Pearson's insolvency.
His answer was treated as good and the cause prepared and tried
upon its merits. This court is of opinion that a good defence was
made out, and is not disposed to deprive Thompson of the benefit of
the defence because he did not specifically allege that Pearson was
insolvent on the day the note fell due, it being evident that the
Chancellor and the appellee regarded and treated the pleadings
as sufficiently specific and direct.
It is not shown that Thompson executed the notes for, the purpose of enabling Pearson to raise money by selling them.
-The petition for a rehearing must be overruled.
The foregoing case is somewhat im- to set off the amount of the encumbrance
perfectly stated, in regard to the facts, upon the land, at the time of the purbut still we think sufficiently so to ren- chase, against the price of the land, for

der the decision intelligible. The pur- which he had given his promissory
chaser of the land attempts, in equity, notes. As negotiable paper in that state
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possest-4 n,) peculiar inmunity against
equitlle del'nces, as between th original parie, this case stands, primarily,
the sanie as if the note were sued in the
name of the original payee.
In such a case it is unquestionably
equitable, for the mortgage to be deducted from tie prite, and only the remainder enforced against the purchaser.
This will in fact, reach the exact justice of the case and save circuity of
action by means of the vendor's covenants of warranty. But still no such
defence is strictly allowable at law.
There being no fraud in the case there
is no ground to claim a rescinding of the
contract : Tlhrnton v. TT.ynn, 12 Wheat.
183; West v. Cutting, 19 Vt. 537.
The breach of the covenants of warranty
of title, can at most, only show a partial failure of consideration of the notes,
and one which the parties provided for
in their contract by the covenants in the
deed. Unless, therefore, the purchaser
had paid off the encumbrance before
suit brought upon the notes, he could
not enforce a set-off by means of
the- breach of the covenants.
The
only remedy would be in a court of
equity. And here the remedy is ample,
provided the counter claims are in fact
mutually in equity, although not so in
form, or at law. Equity will, in such
cases, always interfere in case of insolvency: Blake v. Langdon, 19 Vt. 485,

where the cases are carefully cited and
compared. The result of which is:
1. That courts of equity decree set-off,
anterior to and independent of the
statutes of set-off : Ex parte StepIhens,
11 Vesey 24; Ex pare Blagden, 19
Id. 465 ; Hawkins v. Freeman, 2 Eq.
Cas. Ab. 10, pl. 10. 2. That after the
statute of set-off, 2 Geo. 2 and 5 Geo. 2,
the courts of equity conformed their
practice to the statute, except in cases
of special equity: Lx parte Quintin,
3 Ves. 248. Cases of insolvency, anti
where otherwise one party will pay
jpore than lie really owes, and l!e left
remediless, have always been regarded
as justifying the interference of courts
of equity to decree set-off. And other
equitable grounds of interference are
numerous: Dale v. Cook, 4 Johuns. Ch.
13; 2 Story Eq. Jur.,
1432 et seq.
Equity too might divide the debt of the
appellant, and enable him to first pay
the mortgage, thdn pay the remainder to
the appellee : Ex pare Qintin, supra.
How far the debtor's declaration will
estop him from making the defence, is
mainly matter of construction by the
court, and is not liable to review. But
it is obvious here that the appellant's
language receives a very mild construction. We might about as well, as it
seems to us, come to the opposite conclusion : See Strong v. Ell worth, 26 Vt.
366.
I. F. R.

Circuit Court of the United States, Eastern District of Vrirginia.
AUGUSTUS HANCOCK r ux. v. NEW YORK LIFE INSURANCE
. COMPANY.
The intervention of the late war was a sufficient excuse to the holder of a policy
of life insurance, for not paying his premiums as they accrued during' the war,
the insurer being resident and domiciled upon one side of the military lines, and
the insured upon the other..
A contract may be broken before th time for its performance arrives, by a party
to it repudiating its obligation and declaring that lie will not perform what he has
bound himself to do.
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Therefore, where I1. was insured belbre the wvar, and paid up, hi.c, reimnin
regularly and duly until the war, hut was separated from the in-urer during the

period of the war by the military lines, and as soon as possible after the restoration of peaceful relations, offered to pay to the insurer all. premiums tlat were
accumulated, and to continue paying all such as should accrue, but the insurer

refused to receive them, and repudiated all obligation under the contract : 11(d,
that H. became thereupon immediately entitled to an action against the insurer

for such interest as he might show that he had acquire(] in 'the policy, although
the policy was payable at the time of his death, and although ie was not dead.

IN the year 1851, Augustus Hancock insured his life wilh the
defendant, in the sum of $5000, payable to his wife at his death,
he, Hancock, agreeing to pay the defendant $142 annually at
Richmond, Va., by way of preyfium on the same. iHe paid his
premiums regularly until the war, when the defendant removed
its agency from Richmond, and had no agency within tte military
lines of the Confederate States during the war. As soon after the
war as the defendant re-established an agency in Richmond, Ilancock went to it and offered to pay up all his premiums that had
accumulated during that period, and offered to continue to pay all
such as should accrue in the future. But the defendant reicu-cd
to receive his premiums, and declared the contract at an end, upon
the ground that all his rights under it had been forfeited by his
failure to pay his annual premiums as they fell due, between the
years 1861 and 1865. And they at the same time required him
to take notice that they were under no obligations whatever to
him in respect of said policy. The plaintiff's declaration set out
the case as stated above.
The defendant demurred to the declaration upon two grounds:
1st. That the failure to pay the anual premiums as they accumulated, forfeited the plaintiff's rights under the policy, and 2d,
That, though this were not so, yet no sufficient breach of the contract was alleged, as the time wh6n the contract was to be performed had not yet arrived.
Johnston, Williams and Boulware, for the demurrer.
im. L. Joyall, for the plaintiffs.
On the first point see 31anhattan Life Ins. Go. v. JVarwkk,
20 Gratt. 614; New York Life Ins. Co. v. Clopton, 7 Bush
(Ky.) 179; Ifainilton's _Ex'ors v. The futual Life Lns. Co., 9
Blatch. 234.
Upon the second piitit: It is settled now, that a contract may
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lie broken before the time for its performance arrives, by one party
diselaiming its obligation, thereby giving the other party the right
to treat it as though the time for its fulfilment had passed: Chitty
oi Contracts, 10th Am. ed. 799; H1ochster v. -De La Tour, 2 Ellis
& D". 678; _r'ost v. Knight, Law Reports, 7 Exeh. 111; Avery
v. Bowden, 5 Ellis & B. 714; -DanubeJ. Black Sea Co. v. Xenos,
13 C. B. N. S. 825; -Duganv. Anderson, 36 Md. 567; Jlfountjoy
v. Mietzger, 12 Am. Law Reg. N. S. 442.
It is true it has been many times decided that when a promise
is made to pay money on a certain day, no action will lie until the
day has passed. As, for instance, if A. buy a horse from B., and
promise to pay him $100 for the same one year from that day, no
action will lie for the $100, until the year has passed, and this is
what was held by TANEY, C. J., in the case of Grecnway T.
Gaithecr, Tancy's Decisions 22.7, with the leading case of Jloc1
.cter v. Dc La Tour before him. But there is a radical distinction
betwecn suli a case and the case at bar. Where u promise is
made to pay money at a future day, as in the illustration in regard
to the purchase of a horse, time is of 'the essence of the contract.
But time is not what is stipulated for by the insurer in a policy
of insurance. What he stipulates for is mioney. iHe promises to
pay the insured $5000, provided the insured will pay him $142
every year that he, the insured, shall live. And if the insurer get
that number of annual payments, it is of no consequence to him
at what time he pays the $5000, and lie will have got all that he
stipulated for. The plaintiff ought then to recover in this case
$5000, less as many annual premiums as have accrued since the
beginning of the war up to this time, and less as many more as
will accrue during such time as a jury may think the plaintiff will
live. Each party will then receive what lie originally contracted to
get, and no injustice will be done to any one.
The demurrer was overruled, and at the trial, BOND, Circuit J.,
instructed the jury as follows :"If the jury find that the defendant, The New York Life Ins.
Co., did insure the life of Augustus Hancock, for the term of his
natural life, and for the benefit of Sarah A. Hancock, as set out
in the policy of insurance offered by the plaintiff in evidence; and
if the jury find that the said Sarall A. Hancock complied with the
terms of said policy on her part to be performed by the payment
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of the annual premium of $142 to the agent of said company,
until the said agency was withdrawn by the company because of
the outbreak of hostilities, and if the jury find that within a
reasonable time after the close of hostilities and" the re-establishment of the company's agency at Richmond, the plaintiffs offered
to pay the premiums fallen due during the war, but that the company refused to receive such premiums unless the said Hancock
would submit to a medical examination for a new policy, and
wholly refused to be bound by said contract of life insurance,
then the plaintiff is entitled to recover such damages as they may
find, from the evidence in the cause, the plaintiffs have suffered by
reason of the defendant's breach of contract."
The jury found a verdict for plaintiff for $1371.

Supreme Judicial Court of

faine.

TIE STATE v. LOUIS II. F. WAGNER.
All parts of the state are includcd within the body of one or another of the
several counties into which the state is divided.
When murder hai been done in an unincorporated place, publicly and commonly
known by name, in any one of these counties the venue is well laid, and the place
sufficiently describe'd, if the crime be charged in the indictment as having been
committed at (insert the name by which the place is commonly known) a place
within the county of (name of county) aforesaid, in the absence of anything tending to show that the prisoner would be embarrassed in the preparation of tie
defence for want of a more particular description.
When there is no controversy as to the precise spot on the face of the earth
where the crime was committed, and it appears by ancient charters, legislative
enactments and judicial records that the political authorities of the state and county
have heretofore claimed and exercised jurisdiction over the locality in question,
the question of jurisdiction is one of law for the court, and the defendant cannot
in any stage or form of pleading rightfully claim to have it submitted to the jury
as one of fact, for their determination.
Upon such a question the presiding judge in addition to the matters of which
e will take judicial notice, such as legislative enactments, ancient charters, and
geographical positiun, may refresh his recollection and guide his judgment by
reference to the records of the courts in the county where he sits, general histories
of deceased authors of established reputation, and the records of the censu- of the
inhabitants of the county taken under the laws of the United States by its officers.
It is competent tbr the assistant United States marshal who took the census for
the district, and made the return to the office of the clerk of the courts for the
county, when the record does not show the specific locality wlre the individuals
enumerated resided, to testify as to their place of residence.
When the political authorities of a state have actually claimed and exercised
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jurisdiction over a particular locality, the courts of the state are thereby concluded,
ant will respect such decision, and act accordingly, without questioning the validity
of such claim.
The prisoner was not wronged by the instructions given in this case that proof

that the crime was committed on the island called Smutty Nose, is equivalent to
proof that it was committed within the county of York, and would make the crime
properly cognisable by the court sitting in that county. That instruction was
currect.
The outcries of a person deceased made during the perpetration of the assault
which results in death, or upon the approach of the assailant, arc competent eyi-

dence upon the trial of a party charged with the murder of such person, and may
be considered by tile jury with other circumstances and testimony upon the question of tile identity of the accused.
FIe oteries of~another person who was murdered by the same party a few
same burglary, but on
minutes previously, during the perpetration of ote and tile
another part of tile
premises, are admitted under like circumstances for tie same
purposes upon such trial. "
Such exclamations are competent as part of the res gestx.
Moreover their admission may be distinctly justified for the same reasons which
are held to justify the admission of dying declarations.
The contents of the prisoner's pockets found when lie is arrested may be'put in
evidence when there is testimony tending to show that they or a portion of them
came from the recent possession of the deceased or from the locality 6f the crime.
Articles which a witness identifies as the property of the prisoner, antiin his
possession shortly before the crime was committed, when found shortly after its
perpetration, at the house where the crime was committed, may be offered its

evidence.

IN March 1873, two women were murdered upon "S m utty Nose"
island, one of the group that makes up the Isles of Shoals. At this
time the only inhabitants of this island were John Houtvet and Mary
S., his wife, Evan Christensen and Anethe M., his wife (sister to
Mrs. IHoutvet), and Evan's unmarried sister Karen, and John Houtvet's brother, Matthew, all Norwegians, engaged in fishing. On the
morning of March 5, 1873, the three men above named started in
Johut Iloutvet's fishing vessel for Portsmouth, to procure bait for a
fishing expedition. They were so delayed at Portsmouth as to be compelled to remain there over night, leaving the three women alone upon
the island. During that night their house was entered, Karen killed
in the kitchen, where she was sleeping upon a lounge, and Anethe
murdered out of doors, whither she had fled in terror. Mrs. Hottvet
jumped from her bed-room window, and ran down to that part of the
beach nearest to Hog Island, better known abroad as Appledore, on
which the large hotels, filled every season with sumuier visitors, are
situate. She remained concealed there, in her night-dress, till sunrise,
when she succeeded in attracting the attention of a Norwegian fisherman, living upon Appledore, who came to her rescue. The murders
were evidently conmtittted with an axe, found bloody and bespattered
near the spot. In striking at Karen, the assassin knocked the clock
from its bracket to the lounge beneath, where it was found stopped
at seven mintutes jpast one, indicating the precise time of the first assault.
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By her long exp ,nre at tht inelement sca:son Mrs. Iloutvet's feet were

frozen, and she almo.t peridhcd with cold. As soon as the tragedy was
discovered suspicion fell upon one Louis 11. F. Wagner, a 1'russiai, who
had. at one time, lived on Star Island, and had boarded seven mlonths
of the previous year with Ioutvct, on Smutty Nose, leaving there Ior
Portsmouth in November 1872. It was known that he was destituto
of money, and was informed that Houtvet had six hundred dollars in his
house, and that the men would not return to the Shoals that night.
When Karen was struck in the kitchen, just roused out of sleep, the
curtains being down, and expecting nobody buE Mr. IIoutvct would
be there, she exchimed, "John is searing me 1" " John is killing me F
but as the murderer approached Auethe, in the moonlight (the moon
set it 1.51 A. Il.), she called out repeatedly, "Louis !" "Louis 1"
"Louis !" Search was at once instituted for Wagner, who was found
in Boston, having abruptly, and without notice at his boarding-house,
left Portsmouth before the discovery of the iurder, and, after his arrival at Boston, changed his attire, and shaved off his whiskers.
Various other circumstances strengthened the belief that Mrs. Itoutvet
was correct in swearing that the man she saw striking her sister,
Ancthe, with an axe, was Louis Wagner. Ile was tried at the May
term of the Supreme Judicial Court for York county, at Alfred, in
July 1873 and convicted. His counsel raised a question as to the jurisdiction, and upon the admissibility of Mrs. Houtvet's testimony of the
exclamations of Anethe and Karen, when attacked, and to the introduction of certain coins and an agate button, said once to have belonged
to Anethe, and found upon the prisoner, and of a pencil, said to have
been his, found upon the floor of the house, the morning after the murder. In the indictment the crime was stated to have been committed
"at an island called ' Smutty Nose,' a place within the county of York ;"
it not being mentioned as within the limits of any township in that
county. The respondent contended that this was an insufficient allegation to show jurisdiction, and moved to quash for this defect, but the
presiding justice overruled the motion. Part of the group of little
islands, known as the "1Isles of Shoals," lie in Maine and part in New
Hampshire, the dividing line between these states, at this end of it,
not being very accurately defined. The prisoner's counsel argued
that the question whether or not the locus in quo was within the territory of this state was one to be submitted to the jury; but the justice
presiding at the trial held that it was for the equrt to determine the extent of its own jurisdiction, and admitted, for the purpose of informing
himself upon the geographical and historical bearings of the subject, in
addition to the old surveys, the census returns of 1860, and the testimony of the Deputy U. S. Marshal who made it, to show that certain
persons therein enumerated among the citizens of Maine, and of the
county of York, resided upon Smutty Nose; also works of history, the
records of a court for York county, once held there, &c.. &c. To the
various rulings above indicated the prisoner's counsel excepted.
TnE opinion of the court was delivered by
BARROWS, J.-The prisoner denies the jurisdiction of the court in
which his trial took place, and complains in several respects of the manner in which the presiding judge dealt with the questions which lie
sought to raise touching that branch of his defence.
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I. lie tndc a nmo,tion in the outmot to quash the indictment, alleging
that the llace where the murder was committed is not therein set forth
with suffivient distinctness to enable him to plead properly. The
inotion was overruled. After verdict, he filed a motion in arrest of
judgmient for substantially the same alleged cause. This motion also
w:a, overruled, and to this he excepts.
The allegation in the indictment is that the crime was committed " at
an i-land called 'Smutty Nose,' a place within the county of York
albresaid." It is insisted for the prisoner that such an allegation faihs
to demonstrate York county as the proper venue, lie suggests an
amuuonment by which it could be made more certain, and still conform
to fmets.
We do not see how in the nature of things the allegation could be
nade more precise without tedious and useless prolixity.
We recognise in its fullest reasonable extent the substantial right of
aiparty charged with crime to have the accusation against him formally,
fully and precisely set forth with such circumstances of place and time
as shall not only indicate the jurisdiction of the court before which he
is called to plead, but shall also enable him to prepare his defence understandingly. We cannot see that this right has been infringed in the
indictment before us.
The objection seems to be founded upon the idea that Smutty Nose
Island is not a place which has been recognised, by that name in any
statute of the state, and that therefore the allegation that it is in the
county of York cannot be verified by reference to the public laws, and
hence arises a necessity for further and extrinsic allegations. But the
conclusion does not fbllow from the premises. The averment is distinct
and positive that the crime was committed at a place within the county
of York. and that place is identified with a particularity even greater
than it would be likely to be if the island belonged to any of the
municipal subdivisions of the state, existing by virtue of specific
statutory enactments. While an act of incorporation, had any such existed, might have furnished a more ready means.of verifying the accuracy of the averment, it is not perceived how the want of it can make
any extrinsic allegations necessary, nor how they would subserve any
useful purpose. The waves of the sea define the place as distinctly as
an act of the Legislature could possibly do, and there are abundant
means, as we shall hereafter see, to verify the allegation which is
essential to the maintenance of the jurisdiction. In Brown's Csc, tried
before the full court of this state in 1837, the crime was alleged to
have been committed "at an unincorporated place in said county (of
Cumberland), called the Eight Rod Strip between Poland, in said
county, and Raymond, in said county." The accused bad been
described in the indictment as "Jesse Brown, of Poland, in said county,
esquire, otherwise called Jesse Brown, of an unincorporated place, in
said county, called the Eight Rod Strip," &e. There seems to have
been a doubt whether the place where the crime was alleged to have
been committed was or was not a part of the town of Poland. But apparently the court considered the allegation that it was within the
county sufficient so far as the laying of the venue was concerned. And
why not? In Kh-by's Case, tried in Washinaton county, at the October term 1872, the crime was charged to have been comfiitted "1at an
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unincorporated place called Forest City in the county of Washington."
The name Forest City had been applied to a little settlement which had
grown up in the wilderness about a large tannery; and the dwellinghouses were partly in the county of Washington and.partly in a British
province. Yet able and vigilant counsel made no objection to the sufficiency of the allegation, and no practical difficulty jeopardizing any of
the defendant's rights was developed in the trial.
We think the mode of allegation adopted in the case at bar appropri-ate in all cases where the place is unincorporated, but has nevertheless
a name, and limits known and recognised by the people of the county :
and that it is sufficient to guard well all the substantial rights of the
accused. The motion in arrest of judgment was properly overruled.
II. The prisoner complains of the instruction which took from the
jury the decision of the question whether or not Smutty-Nose Island is
in the county of York. The instruction was ' that proof that the crime
was committed on Smutty Nose Island, is equivalent to proof that it
was committed in the county of York, and- would make the crime properly cognisable by the court sitting in this county."
The instruction was prefaced by a partial statemen- of the reasons
upon which it was based, and it may not be amiss to recur to them.
Before stating the legal proposition above recited the presiding judge
remarked as follows : "It is incumbent on the government to prove the
commission of the crime in the county of York. The allegation is that
it was committed on7 an island called Smutty Nose in the county of
York. All the testimony in the case goes to show that that island was
the scene of the transaction. It is a piece of territory of definite limits
-known by name, and over which the political authorities of this state,
and their predecessors, have exercised jurisdiction. There is no dispute
as to the precise spot upon the face of the earth where the crime was
committed, if committed at all. - It was on the island called Smutty
Nose, and at the house of John C. lIoutvet. I see no evidence tending
to show that a part of the island is in one jurisdiction and a p'art in
another; the whole or none of the island would seem to be in Maine
and in this county." The whole case which is before us shows that the
foregoing statement was indisputably correct. The question of jurisdic-"
tion in this case turned entirely upon the construction of ancient. charters and grants and the legal effect of the actual exercise of jurisdiction
by the political authorities of this state and their predecessors, as shown'
by the records drawn from their archives, over the island which was the
scene of the crime. Under this condition of things the presiding
judge assumed to decide the question as one of law for the court; and
therein we think he did right. Neithmer the construction of charters
or grants, nor the effect of previous acts of jurisdiction as shown by
records, can be a matter for the jury to determine. The force and effect
of charters, grants and records are for the court. Whenever the question of jurisdiction depends upon their construction and effect, it 'is
purely a question of law for the court. And in cases where the political authorities of the state have actually claimed and exercised jurisdiction over particular localities, the doctrine of the law seems to be that
the courts are thereby concluded, and have only to declare the fact and
govern themselves accordingly without undertaking to pass upon the
validity of such claim. Poster & Elam v. Aleilson, 2 Pet. 254 ; State v.
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Dumdl, 3 R. I.127. How can a court of this state sitting for York county
refuse the protetion afforded by our laws and tribunals to the inhabitants
of islands classed and reckoned by our legislature in the apportionment of
representatives to that county, as composing part of its territory and population ? And with what semblance of propriety, after such legislative
recognition, could the judge of such court submit it to the jury in
every case that arose in a poor and sparsely populated locality to dtetermine whether the dwellers there should any longer receive the proteetion
of the laws and the courts which the representatives of their predecessors may have helped to frame and establish ?
Obviously under such circumstances there is nothing for a jury to
pass upon, and a party charged with crime cannot claim, under any fornm
of pleading, to have such a question submitted to the jury for determination, nor complain if his request that it should be so submitted is
overruled. Such a request is merely one of those stumbling-blocks in
the way of justice which it is the business of the court to remove.
Nor is there anything inconsistent with the view which we have here
taken in Jacka ow's asc, 1 Black 484. There the crime was alleged
to have been committed on board a vessel at sea; the place where she
lay being the subject of doubt and testimony. The locality where she
was situated was necessarily previously without occupants. No jurisdiction had ever there been exercised or claimed by the state authorities,
and therefore it became necessary for the jury to determine not only
the precise point where the offence was committed, but also whether it
fell within the boundaries of the state, because there were no proceedings of the state to conclude the court, and no previous exercise of jurisdiction over the watery waste. Such a case bears no analogy to a
case arising upon an island settled two hundred and fifty years ago,
formerly populous and important, respecting which an abundance of
jurisdictional facts appear of record among the files of the court whose
jurisdiction the prisoner was denying.
Even in the absence of a distinct legislative recognition as part of
our state, and of a particular county in it, we think questions whether
the numerous islands along our coast lie within our borders and within
county lines, and are subject to the jurisdiction of our courts, are properly questions for the decision of the court, and once settled must be
deemed settled for ever, and not subject to the varying verdicts of successive juries whenever a person charged with crime sees fit to claim to
throw in a denial of jurisdiction as a make-weight to uaise a doubt in a
ease otherwise clear. A criminal might as well call for the opinion or
the jury upon the regularity of the judge's commission, or the validity
of the election of the Governor by whom he was appointed. The administration of justice becomes possible only by assuming that certain
tiings have been regularly and definitively settled and are so to remain.
The court is bound to take notice of public facts and geographical
positions: Peyroux v. Howard, 7 Peters 342, 348; The Apollon, 9
Wheaton 374. In respect to all such matters, if the memory of the
judge is at fault, or his information not sufficiently full and precise
to induce him to act, "he resorts to such documents of reference as
may be at hand, and he may deem worthy of confidence :" Greenleaf's
Evidence, Vol. I., section 6 : Nor does the fact that the information
thus sought by the judge has been laid before him in the presence
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of tl,: .Jry uihoit any distinct ruling that it was design ed for ii,
court al iie. give a party the right t- in-ist that the jury shl;,l , , upon
it. A\e think that t he presiding judg e was right iil holding that upen
this case here ui-e.sed the question of jurisdictiol was onIe (f, law
which lie was called upon to decide for the purposes otr that hearing;
his deci.ion being subject to revision hy the full court on exceptions.
I 1l. But in case it should be held that the questions arising under his
denial of the jurisdiction were for the court to determine, still the
1prisoner comnplaius that testimony which was legally inadmissible was
lt in to influence the judge's decision. An objection of that sort cannot be deemed available when the case shows that there was that behu'ro
the court which was absolutely conclusive against the position taken by
the prisomer. Of vhat consequence can it be if it turns out that sonic
item which was received by the judge to inform his mind upon the
matter in question (lid not come through a legal channel and ought to
have been excluded, if there still remains that which imperatively required him to hold adversely to the prisoner ?
*The defendant cannot possibly suffer by such a mistake, if there were
one. As we have already seen by the cases above cited, the court has
nothing to do but to recognise the boundaries claimed by the political
authorities of the state under which it acts. Where there has been an
actual claim and exercise of jurisdiction by these authorities, the courts
are bound thereby.
The remark of Chief Justice MIARtSHALL in Foster v. Neilson, ubi
supra, applies also to the boundaries and eourts of the different states
of our union. "A question like this respecting the boundaries of
nations is, as has been truly said, more a political than a legal question
and in its discussion the courts of every country must respect the pronounced will of the legislature."
The ease discloses irrefragable evidence of the practical construction
of the ancient charters and grants adopted" by the political authorities
of this state, and it mattered little what else was or was not offered or
admitted in evidence.
But we do not wish to be understood as holding that any of the evidence received was not admissible. We have no hesitation in declaring
the admissibility of the records produced from the office of the clerk
of the courts for York county. Their antiquity and genuineness were
unquestionable, and they proved conclusively that the legislative act
passed I- att a Generall Courte of Elections held at Boston the 16th of
May 1663," and entitled "The Graunt to Kittery," whereby in consideration that they had "acknowledged themselves subject to the governmnent of the Massachusetts Bay," and, "for the settling of Government
amongst them and the rest within the bounds of these charters," &c..
it is provided ; " 1st, that the whole tract of land beyond the river of
l'iscatag, together with the Isle of Shoales within our said bounds, is and
shal be henceforth a county or shire called by the name of Yorkshire,"
was no mere bruiumfitnen, but was followed by the actual exercise of
jurisdiction civil and criminal, over the territory in question, to which
end courts were held under the political authority of the Massachusetts
Bay upom " the island called Smutty Nose," the records of which courts
are preserved to this day in the proper repository of the records of
York county. The objections urged against their admissibility are that
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it does nat appear that Yorkshire and York county are identical, nor
that the jurisdiction thus exercised was legal, the question not being
raised, and no adjudication having been made with regard to it, so far
as these records show.
The obvious answers are: 1. To the firstobjection, whatever changes
have been made in the boundaries of York county, or shire, must appear
in subsequent legislation, an examination of which shows that the
western and southern boundaries. have always remained the same (with
the exception of a single brief interval lereafter to be noticed), the
new counties having been created front the easterly and northerly portions of Yorkshire: Provincial Act of 1760, establishing two new
counties (Cumberland and Lincoln), in the easterly part of the county
of York; Appendix to Re%. Stat. p. 943; Massachusetts Act of
March 4th 1805, entit'.2d " An Act to incorporate a part of the counties
of York and Cumberland into a separate county by the name of Oxford; Appendix to Rev. Stat. p. 917.
2. To the second objection: We do not sit in judgment upon the
legality of the acquisition of political and civil jurisdiction, by the predecessors of our own political authorities, who have received by regular
course of transmission, and now hold the power once exercised by " The
government of the Massachusetts Bay" over the province of Maine.
If we did, the fiet that the jurisdiction was exercised, unquestioned,
would certainly be no argument against its legality-but rather the reverse. The submission to the jurisdiction so fhr as the records show
was universal. "It has been sometimes said," rewarked Lord ELLENOROUCOI, 1 conmmnvul errorficitjus; but I say corNInunis opinio is evidence of what the law is-not where it is an opinion merely speculative
and theoretical floating in the minds of persons ; but where it has been
made the groundwork and substratum of practice."
General histories of painstaking authors long since deceased, and of
established reputation, like those of Williamson and Belknap, are coinpetent evidence upon a question of this nature. No one claims them
as conclusive or infalible; but carefully used, as aids and guides, and
accepted as true when their statements are unilbrn and consistent with
the evidenice of original records and admnitted on well known facts, they
will be fumnd of great service in arriving at a satisfactory conclusion.
The case oif Evans v. Getting, 6 Car. & 1).586, which was cited at the
trial against their adnission, and which seems also to be the basis of the
remark in Greenleaf's Evidence, Vol. 1, see. 497, to the effect that iii
regard t)the boundaries of a county they arle not admissible, will be
found on examination, by implication to favor the admissibility of general
histories of ,tates. like those of Willianison and Belknap. Iu that case
it was a hi-tory of' ]reckunckshire that was offered to prove the boundary
id ALDERSON. B., rejected it with
between that county and Glanim,',
The writer of tins history probably had the same interest
the remark : 'in enlarging the boundaries of the county as any other inhabitant of it.
It is nit like a general history of Wales."
Counsel umisapprehend the testimony of Mr. Allen, the clerk of the
courts, if' they suppose that tlhe census return were not produced from
the proler r",'sitory in his custoly. They were kept by him with other
VOL. XX11.-8
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files pertaining to the office-of the clerk of the courts, in an office in the
rear ot the treasurer's office, to which tile clerk had a key. Mr. Safford
testified without objection, that he was an Assistant U. S. Marshal for
Maine and took part of the census. The law of the United States under
which it was taken, required the making of the returns by the marshals
and their assistants in the several districts, and the deposits of duplicates
in the office of the clerk of the courts fbr the county in which the district was situated. The return was identified by the assistant marshal
who made it and made the enumeration of which it was the record , and
it was plainly competent to prove by him the thet that certain persons
whose names were borne thereon, lived upon the island of Smutty Nose,
the name of the island not being given in the return but only that of
the group. It was reliable evidence that Smutty Nose island had been
recognised by officials acting under the authority of the government of
the United States, as part of the state of Maine and of the county of
York; and this fact had some probative force, though not conclusive
upon the court as were the acts of political authorities of our' own state.
IV. But again it is claimed that if the question of jurisdiction was
for the court to decide, and the testimony received was competent, still
it was not established that Smutty Nose island is within the county of'
York, and the presiding judge erred in so holding.
The claim will not bear examination.
Upon what was the ruling based? Besides the legislative acts and
record evidence to which we have referred in discussing tile previous
points, we find thathe legislature of this state, before the progress of
decay had left those of the Isle of Shoals which lie within our bounds
entirely without voters, in apportioning representation to the county of
York, assigned one to " Kittery and the Isle of Shoals :" Resolves of
1852, chap. 448. Nor are we left in doubt which of the Isle of Shoals
were here intended. In chap. 29, Resolves of 1829, we have the report
of the commissioners appointed to ascertain, survey and mark the boundary line between the states of Maine and New Hampshire. This report
and the line marked and designated as the true boundary line of said
states therein set forth, were established and confirmed by legislative
Resolves, approved February 28th 1829. This report commences with
the following significant recital: "The report of the commissioners appointed by His Majesty's order in council of February 22d 1735. and
confirmed by his order of the 5th of August, 1740, having established
'that the dividing line shall run up through the mouth of' ]iscataqua
harbor and up the middle of the river of' Neniehanannock, part of which
is now called the Salmon Falls, and through the middle of the same to
the farthest head thereof, &e.,' and that ' the dividing line shall part
the Isles of Shoals and run through the middle of the harbor between
the islands to the sea on the southerly side, &c.,' we have not deemed it
necesssary to commence our survey until we arrived north at the head
of Salmon Falls river."
Going back to the report of the commissioners thus referred to and
adopted, we find that the previously existing and well-known partition
of the Isle of Shoals between the provinces of New Hampshire and
Massachusetts Bay is affirmed ia these terms: " And that the dividing
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line shall part the Isle of Shoals and run through the middle of the harbor
between the islands to the sea on the southerly side ; and that the southwesterly part of said islands shall lie in and be accounted part of the
province of New Iampshire; and that the north-easterly part thereof
shall lie in and be accounted part of the province of Massachusetts
Bay, and be held and enjoyed by the said provinces respectively in the
s.rue manner as they now do, and have heretofore held and enjoyed the
satnle."

This division is traceable through various ancient charters and
grants, as will be seen by referring to the charter of 1629 to 3lason
the Royal charter of 1639 to Gorges and the charter of William and
Mary in 1691 (Ancient Charters, p. 26), in all which the north half of
the Isle of Shoals is treated as belonging to the grant to (Gorges and to
the province of Maine, and the south half to New lampshire ; and it
is to this division, based on the agreement between MIason and Gorges,
in 1624, for a partition of the lands granted to them jointly by the
council of Plymouth, that illusion is made when the commissioners say
in 17:37 that "these islands shall be held and enjoyed by the said provinces respectively in the same manner as they now do, and have heretofore held and enjoyed the same."
Now taking notice, as we are bound to do, of the geographical position of these islands, and of the uncontradieted testimony in the case,
there is no room left for doubt that the line follows the ship channel
between Star and Cedar Islands "through tme middle of the harbor between the islands to the sea on the southerly side," leaving Appledorq,
or Hog Island, and Smutty Nose, still farther within the borders of'
Maine.
Indeed it is not now even pretended that Smutty Nose does not lie in
the " north half" or "north-easterly part" of the Isle of Shoals, but
the ingenuity of counsel is directed to the substantiation of the somewhat fmneiful hypothesis that even if it must be conceded that this portion of the islands has long pertained, first to the province, then to the
district, and now to the state of Maine, still it never was restored to the
county of York' since it. was ordered in 1672 that all those islands " be
adjoined unto the same county to which Star Island belongs." i. e. to the
county of Dover and Portsmouth. The whole group had been previously, in 1661, 1: allowed to be a township called Appledore," and to
"have cquall power to regulate theire towne affaires as other townes of
this jurisdiction have." by an actor the Massachusetts General Court, in
whiit,is said that they "do lye partly in the county of 'orke and the
other parte in the jurisdiction of Dover and Portsmouth."
But it was only for a very brief interval that jurisdiction of the
north half of the Isle of Shoals was withdrawn from the county of York
by the Act of 1672. That act was passed while the government of
llassachusetts Bay was claiming to extend its jurisdiction over Mason's
part of Laconia as well as that of Gorges. But in July 1679, the
Massachusetts colony was notified of the King's intention to disallow
this claim as to New Hampshire, and requimed to revoke all commissions
which they had granted there, which were all declared null and void,
and in September a commission for the government of New Hampshire
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was issued which "inhibits and restrains the jurisdiction exercised by
the colony of Massachusetts over the towns of Portsmouth, ])over,
Exeter and lampton, and all other lands extending from three miles to
the northward of the river Merrimack and of any and every part thereof to the province of Maine."
Thus the attempted annexation was effectually annulled. The York
county records show abundant subsequent evidence of the exercise of
jurisdiction over the north half, which was represented in the iassaliusetts General Court in 1692, by Roger Kelly and William Lakeman,
and the "south half" is again particularly mentioned in the counmissions fbr the government of New Hampshire.
But it is needless to multiply the historical proofa. Chapter 448 of
our Legislative Resolves, passed in 1852, assigning these islands to constitute part of one of the representative districts of York county. would
suffice to destroy the ingenious fhbric which counsel have created. We
simply follow the legislature of' our state in declaring the north half of
the Isle of Shoals including Smutty Nose to be a part of the county of
York as well as (if the state of Maine.
, Was there error in permitting Mrs. Iloutvet to rehearse to the
jury the outcries which were inade by Karen and Anethe respectively
upon the approach of tie murderer ?
It might perhaps be said that since Mrs. Iloutvet. testifies positively
that tile nan who was there and murdered these women was Wagner,
the prisoner, lie cannot complain of the admission (if all that was said
-in his presence. It may be that it would not be unreasonable to say
that inasmuch as the judge in his instructions to the jury made use of
the circumstance which alone could be deemed unfavorable to tile prisoner. only to caution the jury not to rely too confidently upon Mrs.
Hotvet's testinony identityimg Wagner, on the spot, but she might
have mistaken some other person for him because she was expecting, by
reason ot Anethe's exelanmation, to see him, the defendant could not
have been prejudiced by the testimony.
But we prekr to place its admission upon a different ground. Looking at all the circumstances attending their outcries, and especially the
fact that Anethe's recognition of the prisoner was in the open air and
in tile bright moonlight, we cannot doubt that what she said did have
not a little weight in the iniids of the jury against him upon tile question of identity. We think it might legitimately he used for that purpose Tile court in Mas-achusetts went, further ini time case of Comrmonwealth v. McPice, 3 Cushing 181, in admhuitting the statement of the
injured person imade shortly aftor the inflietion or the wound and while
she was lying, on the floor bleeding proftusely. -' that John (imeaning the
defendlta)
had stabbed her." The statemient was made when time accused was not present, and tile testiiony was admitted against time objection ot the defendant without proof* that the wounded person had given
up all hope of recovery. so as to make it competent as a dying declaraion. The statement was accompanied hy a request to the witness to go
for a physician, but very clearly the sole use to which it was to be put
in the trial, was to ideiitily the delfndmt as the person who inflicted
the injury. And the court held that "the period of time at which these
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acts and statements took place was so recent after the receiving of the
injury as to justify the admission of the evidence as a part of the rea
gesta."
The testimony in the case at bar, the competency of which we are
considering, was let in by the presiding judge with a similar remark.
This is criticised in argument oilthe ground that here was no act of the
deceased which it was necessary to explain, and that declarations to be
competent as part of the rcs gestx, must accompany such an act on the
part of the declarant. It is a matter of very little consequence whether
a reason assigned by a judge at nisi prius for his ruling is or is not
technically accurate and sound. Doubtless what may be denominated
a sound legal instinct produces many correct rulings upon the admissibility of testimony when the judges who made them might not be ready
to state the true reason with precision, or even with a perfet comprehension of the proper grounds upon which the admission or exclusion
should be placed. Compendious phrases, used in similar connections,
are very apt to suggest themselves to the mind on such occasions, when
they d'onot in faet express the true principle upon which the action of
the court is founded. The same formula may have an application, more
or less suitabl6 and exact, to a considerable variety of cases; and the
all-embracing phrase res gestw is very apt to come up, when we are contemplating any of the fTets and circumstances that accompanied the
principal transaction which is the subject of investigation in any aspect
I
of them.
The question before us is not whether the presiding judge placed the
admission of this testimony upon exactly the true ground, but whether
it is conmpetent testimony upon the question of identity. We are
clearly of opinion that it is. The doctrine which we hold is this. The
outcries of a person deceased, during the perpetration of the assault
which results in death, or upon the approach of the assailant, are competent evidence upon the trial of a party charged with the murder of
such person, and may be considered by the jury with other circumstances and testimony upon the question of the identity of the accused.
The outcries of another person who was murdered by the same party,
a few minutes previously, during the perpetration of one and the same
burglary, but on another part of the premises, are admissible under like
circumstances for the same purpose upon such trial.
Such outcries certainly partake much of the nature of res gest-more
distinctly so than the statement in Commonivealthk v. Ac Pike. ubi supra,
which accompanied the sending for a physician, but we think that the
precise ground upon which their admission shnu!d be placed in a case
like this is sub.ztantially the same as that upon which dying declarations
are declared admissible.
Speaking of dying declarations Roscoe says (Crim. Evid.. p. 30):
"Evidence of this kind which is peculiar to the case of homicide has
been considered by some to be admissible from necessity, since it often
happens that there is no third person present to be an eye-witness to the
fact, and the usual witness in other TMlonies, viz., the party injured
himself, is got rid of; but it is said by EYRE, C.B., that the general
principle upon which evidence of this kind is admitted is that it is of
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declarations made in extremity, when the party is at the point of death
* * * when every motive to falsehood is silenced, and the mind is
induced by the most powerful considerations to speak the truth. A situation so solemn and so awful is considered by the law as creating an
obligation equal to that which is imposed by an oath administered in
court." Roscoe adds, "probably it is the concurrence of both these
reasons which led to the admission of this species of evidence." Both
these conditions exist in the case at bar. There is as truly a necessity
to corroborate the testimony of a surviving witness, whose testimony to
the identity of the murderer and the accused may be attacked on the
ground that in the darkness and the excitement she was liable to mistake, as there is to furnish evidence where o person who witnessed the
assault remains alive. Moreover, it is the danger that no surviving
witness can be found which operates to establish the rule which is of
general application, and the fact that, in this particular ease, one did
survive, would not abrogate it.
And as to the second condition, no one can doubt that the exclainations of these two women embodied the truth as it appeared to each, and
that the cries of alarm or supplication uttered by any and all human
beings under similar circumstances would express their perceptions of
existing facts as truly as if backed by the sanction of all the oaths
known in Christendom. To reject the evidence afforded by the
agonized entreaties of one standing face to face with death, in the person of' a murderer, with uplifted weapon, when we would accept the
account of the affair afterwards given by the enfeebled victim, with perceptions and recollections darkened and dimmed by the mists and
shadows of approaching dissolution, would !be, we think, but a bad sampie of "the perfection of human reason." It is not to such exclamations that any of the substantial objections to hearsay testimony can be
held to apply. Those outcries were as plainly circumstances proper for
the consideration of the jury in the attempt to ascertain whether
the prisoner was guilty of that crime, as any other portion of the circumstantial evidence in the case. Manifestly, the tendency of Karen's
exclamation, "John seared me! John killed me!" was to exculpate the
defendant, and to direct suspicion towards John Houtvet, the head of
the family. If it had been withheld by the government, and the
defendant had offered to prove it, should we have felt justified in excluding a fact from which, if uncontrolled, such a pregnant inference could
be drawn ? Certainly, as in every case of proof drawn from circumstances, caution is required to avoid drawing rash and unfounded inferences, and the declarations are liable to be controlled by other proved
facts, as Karen's were in the present instance, but the liability to mistake and error inherent in all descriptions of human testimony is not so
great in this as to justify its exclusion.
We think that the reception of this testimony is justified both on
principle and authority. It is the fact of a contemporaneous recognition or non-recognition of the accused by the deceased, which possesses
any probative force ; and any declaration, made at the time, evincive of
that fact, may fairly be said to come within the principle which regulates and permits the admission of declarations of third persons when
they form a part of the res geste. It would justify their reception even
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if th-it yerJ thlic s le gronind upon which it could be placed. Nor do
we think that anythinir in the learned and able discussion of that priiciple
by F'E-rcmEit, J., in LundI v. TZyngsborough, 9 Gush. S6, can justly be
said to militate against fleir admission. We do not wish to be understood as holding that the dread of immediate death is indispensable to
the admission of contemporaneous exclamations of recognition like theve,
in eases of homicide. We merely say that whatever force is given to
dying declarations as the utterances of those, who, on account of their
peculiar situation, may be relied on to tell the exact truth as it alilears
to them, must needs be accorded also to the exclamations of oorial
terror caused by a deadly'assault.
VI. The objection to the admission of package marked B., which e,,sisted of the contents of Wagner's pockets when lie was searelicil li,the officers in Boston, the evening after the murder, is still insistd ,,.i
mainly upon the ground that the articles had not been identilied cxevltr
as having been found in Wagner's possession. It is not easy to .e how
they could have been in any respect prejudicial to the prisoner's (case,
if they had not been substantially proved to have come from the liou,.e
which was the scene of the murder and robbery.
It is true that the articles were none of them such as were liktivk to
be positively identified. But there was evidence that the day beflre'the
murder, Karen had placed in her purse which had contained a silver
half dollar and "a lot of coppers," a single small white porcelain button.
The following evening, among the contents of the prisoner's pockets.
appeared a silver half dollar, " a lot of coppers" and a single sinall
white button of the same description as that which Karen had placed
in her purse the afternoon before, and unlike any which the prisoner
had upon any of his clothes. Karen's purse was found upon the floor
of the house entirely empty.
These circumstances were competent evidence taken by themselves.
by no means conclusive, but in connection with others not insignificant.
We do not understand that positive identification is essential in such
-cases. Proof of the possession of similar property with such circumstances as tend to establish the identity, if unexplained, may furnish
ground for a legitimate inference, the force and value of which the jury
must determine in view of all the circumstances of the ease.
It is impossible to imagine that the exhibition of the articles respect.
ing which there was no evidence tending to show that they came from
loutvet's house, could have injured the defendant. Moreover there
was ho objection to any specific articles, but only to the package as a
whole.
VII. We see no ground for the complaint of the admission of the
pencil. A witness testified that it was the prisoner's pencil, and that lie
saw it in his possession at Portsmouth a few days befo're tihe imurder.
Another witness testified to finding it it) the entry of l1outvet's house
a d-iy or two after the murder. If bth statements were true, the fiets
were significant. An examination of the pencil itself was likely to be
serviceable in enabling the jury to determine whether any witness could
identify it with certainty.

None of tihe other exceptions to the rulings in relation to the admission or exclusion of testimony is relied on in argument, and a careful
review of the case satisfies us that they are all devoid of mierit.

